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Recent Developments 
In Re: Mark M. 2000 
A Trial Court May Not Delegate Its Judicial Authority to a Non-Judicial Agency 
or Person to Determine the Visitation Rights of aParent 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that when 
detern1ining the visitation rights of 
parents under Md. Code Ann., Fam. 
Law. § 9-101 (1999), a trial court 
may not delegate its judicial authority 
to a non-judicial agency or person. In 
re: MarkM. 2000,365 Md. 687, 782 
A.2d 332 (2001). Additionally, the 
court held, a parent can make a motion 
to compel a physical or mental 
examination of a child pursuant to 
Maryland Rule 11-105 and Md. Code 
Ann., Fam. Law. § 3-818, when there 
is demonstrated good cause for the 
examination and a showing that the 
exam will not be harmful to the child. 
Id. at 717,718,782 A.2d at 350. 
On July 5, 1994, Helen M. 
("Helen") gave birth to her son Mark 
M. ("Mark"). Mark lived with Helen 
and Donald M., the father of Mark's 
sister Mary M. ("Mary"), in their 
Montgomery County, Maryland, 
home. On March 21, 1995, the 
Montgomery County Department of 
Social Services ("DSS") filed a 
petition, asserting that Mark and Mary 
should be declared children in need 
of assistance ("CINA"). The petition 
alleged that physical abuse, neglect, 
and substance abuse occurred in the 
children's home. Shortly thereafter, 
during the Spring of1995, the Juvenile 
Court found Mark to be a child in 
need of assistance and committed him 
to foster care. However, Helen fled 
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the state with Mark, which delayed 
Mark's foster placement with his 
paternal grandmother until June of 
1998. 
On June 16, 1999, Helen filed 
two motions in the district court. The 
first was a Motion for Order to 
Enforce Visitation, asserting her 
attempts to visit with Mark were 
denied unless she consulted with 
Mark's therapist, and the second 
Motion asked that Mark be evaluated 
by an independent therapist of her 
choosing. The district court denied 
both motions and held that visitation 
was to occur only when Mark's 
therapist recommended it. Helen 
appealed to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed 
the district court's decision regarding 
both motions. On November 27, 
2000, Helen filed a Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari with the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland. The court granted her 
petition to detern1ine whether, it was 
improper for a juvenile judge to order 
that visitation between Helen and 
Mark be withheld until Mark's 
therapist recommended it, and 
whether it was an abuse of discretion 
to refuse to allow Mark to be 
evaluated by an independent 
psychiatric expert. 
The court of appeals began its 
analysis by first addressing the trial 
court's order that visitation was not 
to occur between Helen and Mark 
until Mark's therapist recommended 
it. Id. at 705, 782 A.2d at 342. The 
court noted that a parent's interest in 
raising a child is a fundamental right, 
recognized by the United States 
Supreme Court in Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). Id. 
at 705, 782 A.2d at 342-43. 
However, the State also has an 
interest in caring for children, who 
cannot care for themselves, pursuant 
to the doctrine of parens patriae. !d. 
at 705, 782 A.2d at 343. Therefore, 
a parent's otherwise acknowledged 
right may be denied where evidence 
of abuse exists; because, "courts are 
required by statue to deny custody 
or unsupervised visitation unless the 
court makes a specific finding that 
there is no likelihood of further child 
abuse or neglect." Id. at 706, 782 
A.2d at 343. 
In reaching this conclusion, the 
court relied on its interpretation of 
Section 9-10 1, which sets forth 
guidelines forjuvenile courts to follow 
when determining parental visitation 
rights in CINA proceedings. Id. at 
707, 782 A.2d at 344. Section 9-
10 1 of the Family Law Article states: 
(aj Determination by the 
court- In any custody or visitation 
proceeding, if the court has 
reasonable grounds to believe that a 
child is has been abused or neglected 
by a party to the proceeding, the 
court shall detern1ine whether abuse 
or neglect is likely to occur if custody 
or visitation rights are granted to the 
party. 
(b) Specific finding required-
Unless the court specifically finds that 
there is no likelihood offurther child 
abuse or neglect by the party, the court 
shall deny custody or visitation rights 
to that party, except that the court may 
approve a supervised visitation 
arrangement that assures the safety 
and the physiological, psychological, 
and emotional well-being of the child. 
!d. at 708, 782 A.2d at 344. 
Therefore, "when a court has 
reasonable grounds to believe that 
abuse has occurred, as did the juvenile 
COUli in this case, visitation must be 
denied unless the court specifically 
finds that there is no likelihood of 
further abuse or neglect." Id. at 708, 
782 A.2d at 344. 
In the present case, the court 
of appeals found that the juvenile court 
had properly exercised its discretion 
by denying Mark's parents visitation 
after he was found to be a child in need 
of assistance. Id. However, when 
the district court declared that 
visitation was notto occur until Mark's 
therapist recommended it, the district 
court improperly delegated its 
authority and committed error.Id. at 
708, 782 A.2d at 344. According to 
the court of appeals, a proper 
interpretation of section 9-101 (b) 
dictates that once a denial of visitation 
is deemed appropriate, the only 
method of supplying the child's parents 
with visitation is through a subsequent 
court proceeding. Id. at 709, 782 
A.2d at 345. Therefore, "the court 
must not permit another agency or 
person to perform the very task for 
which the court has been so 
entrusted". Id. at 710, 782 A.2d at 
345. 
The next issue the court 
addressed was whether the juvenile 
court abused its discretion by denying 
Helen her request to have Mark 
examined by a clinical child 
psychologist ofher choosing pursuant 
to Rule 11-105 and Section 3-818. 
Id. at 710, 782 A.2d at 346. Both 
Rule 11-105 and Section 3-818 are 
silent with regard to independent 
medical examinations, unless they are 
made by the state at the direction of 
the court, or by the court's order sua 
sponte.Id. at 713, 782 A.2d at 347. 
Thus, the court turned to statutory 
interpretation to ascertain the scope 
and breadth of examinations 
contemplated by the Maryland 
legislature. Id. at 710, 782 A.2d at 
346. 
The court found, that the 
legislative intent of Rule 11-105 and 
Section 3-818 was to protect the best 
interests of a child during a 
proceeding.Id. Therefore, itwould 
be in the best interests of a child to 
allow any party, including a parent, to 
a ClNA proceeding to submit a 
motion for an independent medical 
evaluation. Id. at 717, 782 A.2d at 
350. However, the party making the 
motion must demonstrate good cause 
for the examination, and be able to 
show that the proposed examination 
will not be harmful to the child.Id. 
In reaching this conclusion, the 
court emphasized that subjecting a 
child to numerous examinations could 
be harmful and have a very damaging 
effect on the rest of child's life, clearly 
this would be against his or her best 
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interests.Id. at 718,782 A.2d at 350. 
Therefore, the court of appeals held 
the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by denying Helen's motion 
for an independent medical evaluation 
of Mark, because she failed to 
demonstrate the absence ofhann such 
an evaluation could have on him.Id. 
at 719, 782 A.2d at 351. 
The Maryland Court of Appeals 
holding in Mark M. 2000, establishes 
the bright line rule that trial courts can 
never delegate their judicial authority 
regarding visitation deternlinations, 
between a parent and child, in CINA 
proceedings. In addition, Mark M. 
2000 establishes that a parent may 
request an independent medical 
evaluation of their child during a CINA 
proceeding, when the exam win not 
be harmful to the child and is 
supported with good cause. By doing 
so, the court emphasized the 
importance of adhering to the best 
interests of the child when making 
decisions during ClNA proceedings. 
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